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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recently issued 
decision in Griffis v. Luban1 arrived among claims of protection for 
free speech on the Internet,2 the court missed a significant
† Laura S. Ferster is an attorney with the Labor and Employment Group of 
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  J.D., 1998 cum laude,
University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).
2. See Mark A. Cohen, Web Posting Didn’t Give Foreign State Jurisdiction;
Alabama Judgment Can’t Be Enforced in Minnesota, MINNESOTA LAWYER, July 15, 2002, 
at 1.
1
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opportunity to clarify the developing law surrounding Internet 
contacts sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over non-
residents.  Instead, the court injected additional variables into 
established personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Specifically, the 
Griffis court imported a new and completely unnecessary personal 
jurisdiction test for use in claims involving intentional torts.
The personal jurisdiction test for intentional torts that serves 
as the focal point of the Griffis holding was adopted from the Third 
Circuit’s decision of IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG.3  As this 
article will explain, the adoption of the IMO Industries test appears 
to displace existing due process notions and Minnesota authority 
that would have adequately addressed the issues in Griffis.4  This 
confusing addition to Minnesota’s case law will likely produce more 
questions than it answered regarding not only Internet contacts 
and personal jurisdiction, but also the status of Minnesota personal 
jurisdiction law generally.  Therefore, although the supreme court 
reached the correct result in Griffis, the decision’s impact and 
precedential value are in question.
This article attempts to analyze the reasoning of Griffis and 
critiques the court’s adoption of the Third Circuit’s test.  Part II 
discusses the facts of Griffis; Part III analyzes both the court of 
appeals’ and the supreme court’s decisions in Griffis, with emphasis 
on the supreme court’s decision and the underlying concepts of 
personal jurisdiction that were cited, used, or ignored by the court; 
and Part IV illustrates alternative reasoning the Griffis court could 
have used in making its decision, and concludes that, for all intents 
3. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535 (adopting the test articulated in IMO Industries. 
Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998), which ostensibly crafts and 
applies a modified version of the effects test derived in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984)).
4. In Minnesota, the fairness of exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant has been determined by applying a five-factor test. See, e.g. 
M.G. Incentives, Inc. v. J.J. Marchand, 2001 WL 96223, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001).  Under this test, the court examines the following factors: “(1) the quantity 
of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quality and nature of the contacts; (3) 
the connection between the cause of action and the contacts; (4) the state’s 
interest in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience to the parties.” Id. (citing
KSTP-FM, LLC v. Specialized Communications, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999)); Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 
1978).  This test summarizes significant personal jurisdiction principles into a 
cohesive approach ensuring uniform application of due process protections. See
also Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn. 1992) 
(analyzing similar factors in holding that minimum contacts were sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction).
2
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and purposes, Griffis is—or should be—limited to its exceptionally 
unique procedural posture.
II. GRIFFIS: FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
In Griffis v. Luban, a Minnesota resident (“Luban”) was sued in 
an Alabama court by an Alabama resident (“Griffis”) for
defamation and invasion of privacy.5  Luban and Griffis had both 
participated in an Internet newsgroup that was organized around 
the topic of archeology.6  Luban maintained a non-professional
interest in the history and culture of ancient Egypt.  Griffis taught 
noncredit courses in ancient Egyptian history and culture at the 
University of Alabama and also worked as a self-employed
consultant.7 Through their postings to the newsgroup, a
disagreement between Luban and Griffis arose on the subject of 
Egypt and Egyptology.8  In the course of their on-line
disagreement, Luban posted challenges to Griffis’ professional
credentials on the newsgroup website.9  After filing her defamation
suit, Griffis obtained a default judgment in an Alabama court 
against Luban, who had been advised by counsel not to answer the 
Alabama complaint.10  Thereafter, Griffis sought enforcement of 
the judgment in Minnesota.11
Under Minnesota law, a defendant has the right to contest an 
action based on a foreign court’s judgment by demonstrating “that 
the foreign court rendered the judgment in the absence of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”12
Such judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit in
Minnesota.  Minnesota courts will uphold a foreign
5. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d. at 528.
6. Id. at 530 (explaining that an Internet newsgroup is a “forum for Internet 
users that addresses a specific topic and allows participants to exchange
information and engage in discussions or debate by ‘posting’ messages on the 
website” and noting that the newsgroup could be “accessed anywhere by any 






12. Id. at 531 (citing David M. Rice, Inc. v. Intrex, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 370, 372 
(Minn. 1977)).
3
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court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant when two requirements are met: 
(1) compliance with the foreign state’s law providing 
jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction under 
circumstances that do not offend the Due Process Clause 
of the federal constitution [sic].13
The district court found that Alabama’s long-arm statute permitted 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Luban and that such 
jurisdiction complied with the Due Process Clause.14  Therefore, 
the Minnesota district court found that Alabama had personal 
jurisdiction over Luban and thus its judgment should be afforded 
full faith and credit.15
B. Griffis in the Minnesota Court of Appeals
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s 
decision, also concluding that the Alabama court properly
exercised personal jurisdiction over Luban.16  The court of appeals 
analyzed Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law, which differs from 
Minnesota’s long-arm statute in that it does not contain a special 
exclusion for defamation and privacy claims, and applies principles 
of due process to the full extent allowed under the Constitution.17
13. Id. (citing Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Acts, MINN. STAT.
§ 548.27 (2000); Hutson v. Christensen, 295 Minn. 112, 117, 203 N.W.2d 535, 538 
(1972); Intrex, 257 N.W.2d at 372).
14. Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 551-52 (noting that in contrast to Minnesota’s long-arm statute, 
Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law contains no exclusions for claims of
defamation); see MINN. STAT. § 543.19 subd. 1 (2001).
As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this 
subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject 
matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign
corporation or any nonresident individual, or the individual’s
personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a 
domestic corporation or the individual were a resident of this 
state.  This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the 
foreign corporation or nonresident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property
situated in this state, or
(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property 
damage, or
(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property
damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no 
jurisdiction shall be found:
4
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In its decision, the court of appeals adopted the reasoning of a 
United States Supreme Court case, Calder v. Jones,18 which held that 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants for purposes of
intentional torts may be exercised where the “effects of their 
intentional conduct were felt in the forum state.”19  The court of 
appeals, relying on Calder, found that Luban “should have foreseen 
that she might be sued in Alabama because she had actual
knowledge of the effect that her messages were having in
Alabama.”20  The court of appeals viewed Luban’s postings as 
sufficient contact with the state of Alabama because she made the 
postings “even after she was threatened with legal action” by Griffis’ 
lawyer.21  The court also expressly found that (1) the messages 
could have been and were received in Alabama; (2) Luban was 
aware her messages would be read in a foreign state; and (3) Luban 
was aware her messages were causing damage in Alabama.22  Thus, 
the court of appeals held, “[Luban] should have realized that by 
making potentially defamatory statements that were being read in 
Alabama, she could be haled into court in Alabama to prove the 
truth of those statements.”23
C. Griffis in the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
holding that the Alabama court did not have personal jurisdiction 
(1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; 
or
(2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought 
under the state’s jurisdiction would violate fairness and
substantial justice; or
(3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
19. Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 552 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 787 n.6); see IMO
Indus. Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d. Cir. 1998) (citing Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)) (stating that Calder essentially examined the following 
three factors to determine whether personal jurisdiction existed: (1) whether the 
defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) whether the plaintiff felt the brunt 
of the harm caused by that tort in the forum such that the forum state was the 
focal point of the plaintiff’s injury; and (3) whether the defendant expressly aimed 
the tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum state was the focal point of 
the tortious activity).
20. Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 552-53.
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over Luban when it rendered its default judgment.24  Like the court 
of appeals, the Minnesota Supreme Court, analyzed Alabama’s 
personal jurisdiction law by applying the principles of due process 
to the full extent allowed under the Constitution.25  After
articulating the basic, long-standing principles of personal
jurisdiction, the Griffis court went on to focus on two specific 
federal cases—Calder and IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG.26
Importantly, the IMO Industries test is essentially a repackaging of 
the Calder test.27  Thus, both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court essentially relied on the same case—
Calder v. Jones—yet reached different conclusions.  Specifically, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found, inter alia, that Luban’s postings 
to the Internet newsgroup were not sufficient to show that she 
knew Griffis would suffer harm in Alabama.28  Therefore, the 
Alabama judgment was not enforceable in Minnesota.29
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GRIFFIS HOLDING
A. “Sound Bites” of Fair Play and Substantial Justice
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Griffis cites several 
well-known United States Supreme Court decisions in articulating 
the due process standards of personal jurisdiction.30  However, the 
24. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536-37 (Minn. 2002).
25. Id.
26. 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998). 
27. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258 (3rd. Cir. 2001) (analyzing how 
the court in IMO Indus. applied the three-prong effects test of Calder); Christopher
Allen Kroblin, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach for Intentional Torts:
Implications for Cyber Contacts, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 72-75 (2001) 
(describing the court’s analysis in IMO Indus. as systematically applying the factors 
developed in Calder’s effects test, specifically focusing on the express aiming 
requirement); Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and 
Substantial Justice Lost in Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory 
Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 330 (2001) (quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 
265) (describing IMO’s use of the effects test and concluding that the defendant 
must “manifest behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on [the forum]” for 
Calder to be satisfied).
28. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 536-37.
29. Id. at 537.
30. Id. at 532 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
(1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1985); Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Perkins v. Benguet 
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
6
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Griffis decision merely cites the key language from these cases while 
ignoring the principles they established.  A brief review of these 
decisions is therefore appropriate.
The Griffis decision first cites the 1945 seminal case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,31 in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that a shoe company with sales persons 
operating in a local forum had sufficient minimum contacts with 
the forum state such that maintenance of a suit for contribution to 
the state’s unemployment compensation fund did not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”32  The 
Court recognized the shift from a strictly geographical basis to a 
procedural due process basis for personal jurisdiction:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment 
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the 
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court was prerequisite to its 
rendition of a judgment personally binding him . . . .  But 
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to 
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due 
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.33
International Shoe was responsible for articulating the bedrock 
principles of modern day personal jurisdiction analysis.  It infused 
the analysis with the notion that due process must be measured by 
the “quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws that it was the purpose of the 
Due Process Clause to insure [sic].”34  The Court in International
Shoe further stated that the Due Process Clause does not “make 
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate 
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”35
Thus, early cases recognized the need for flexible standards of 
personal jurisdiction that protected due process and notice rights 
U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
31. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32. Id. at 316 (internal citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 319.
35. Id.
7
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of potential defendants.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall36 is cited by the 
Griffis court in its analysis of personal jurisdiction for the following 
proposition: “In judging minimum contacts for purposes of
assessing the validity of specific jurisdiction, a court focuses on the 
‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.’”37  In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death 
action in Texas against a Colombian corporation.38  The United
States Supreme Court analyzed the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state under the rubric of “general jurisdiction”39 since the 
parties had agreed that the dispute did not “arise out of” and was 
“not related to” the defendant’s activities within the forum.40  The 
Court held that the defendant did not have sufficient contacts with 
Texas for general jurisdiction.41  While Helicopteros is meaningful to 
distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction, its
application does not advance the analysis of specific personal 
jurisdiction at issue in Griffis.
Griffis cites Hanson v. Denckla,42 stating that “[f]or the
minimum contacts requirement to be satisfied, the defendant must 
have ‘purposefully avail[ed]’ herself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State . . . .”43  In Hanson v. Denckla, the 
Supreme Court decided that a Florida state court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over an indispensable Delaware party, a
trustee for a decedent’s Delaware trust, in a controversy involving 
rights to the Delaware trust.44  The decedent in Hanson had 
36. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
37. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414-15).
38. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410.
39. Id. at  414-15  (explaining that general jurisdiction involves the exercise of 
jurisdiction over a non-resident where, although the cause of action does not arise 
out of or relate to the nonresident’s activities in the forum, there are otherwise 
sufficient contacts between the state and the nonresident) (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 415.
41. Id. at 411, 416 (Defendant’s contacts were as follows: it had purchased 
80% of its helicopter fleet, spare parts, and accessories in excess of $4 million from 
a company in Texas; it sent prospective pilots to Texas for training and to ferry the 
aircraft to South America; it sent management and maintenance personnel to visit 
its helicopter supplier in Texas to become familiar with the plant and for technical 
consultation; and it received into its New York City and Panama City, Florida bank 
accounts over $5 million in payments drawn from a Texas bank.).
42. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
43. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting and
modifying Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
44. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.
8
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established the trust in Delaware before moving to Florida where 
she became a resident.45  The Hanson Court decided that the 
Delaware court properly refused to enforce a Florida judgment, 
thus denying the judgment full faith and credit in Delaware.46  The 
Hanson Court cited International Shoe for the proposition that “it is 
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 
protection of its laws.”47  The Court found that the Delaware trustee 
did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida where the 
only connection with the forum resulted from decedent’s decision
to exercise her power of appointment there.48  The trust company 
at issue had no office in Florida, neither held nor administered any 
business assets in Florida, and solicited no business there.49  The 
Court explained that the unilateral activity of the party asserting 
the existence of a relationship does not provide the requisite 
contact with the state necessary for personal jurisdiction and that 
the “suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that 
arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida.”50  Under 
these circumstances, the Court was unwilling to find personal 
jurisdiction over the Delaware resident.
Griffis also cites World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson51 for the 
often stated proposition: “[t]he defendant’s conduct and
connections with the forum state must be such that the defendant 
‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”52  In 
World-Wide Volkswagen, the individual plaintiffs, residents of New 
York, sued the defendant, a New York corporation, in Oklahoma 
for injuries sustained in Oklahoma from an accident in an
automobile that had been purchased in New York.53  The accident 
occurred while the plaintiffs were driving through Oklahoma.54  In 
concluding that the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over 
the defendant, the Court determined that the defendant carried 
45. Id.
46. Id. at 254-55.
47. Id. at 253.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 251.
50. Id. at 252-53.
51. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
52. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
53. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286.
54. Id.
9
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on no activity in Oklahoma, made no direct sales, and provided no 
services there.  Thus, the Court held, the defendant did not avail 
itself of the privileges or benefits of Oklahoma’s laws.55  In so
finding, the Supreme Court discussed the transformation of the 
American economy and the relaxation of the limits imposed by the 
Due Process Clause, but stated that “[n]evertheless, we have never 
accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the 
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”56
The Court held that where an individual or corporate defendant 
has no contacts, ties, or relations with the state, personal
jurisdiction will not be found.57  The Court stated:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the 
tribunals of another state; even if the forum State has 
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even 
if the forum State is the most convenient location for 
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument 
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the 
State of its power to render a valid judgment.58
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court refused to base jurisdiction
on the isolated occurrence of the accident in Oklahoma and 
rejected the argument that the inherent mobility of the automobile
made it foreseeable that the vehicle at issue would cause injury in 
Oklahoma.59  As to foreseeability, the Court stated “[t]he
foreseeability that is critical to the due process analysis” is “the 
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such 
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”60  The Court further stated that “the Due Process Clause, by 
ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ gives a degree of 
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as 
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”61
55. Id. at 295.
56. Id. at 293 (attributing this transformation of the American economy to 
the advancement of technology and the nationalization of commerce through the 
increased use of phone lines and travel).
57. Id. at 294.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 295.
60. Id. at 297.
61. Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
10
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Given the defendant’s lack of purposeful activities, the Court held 
it could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in 
Oklahoma.62
The Griffis court, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, noted 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has explained that specific jurisdiction 
may be found where the nonresident defendant has ‘purposefully
directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation 
results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those 
activities.’”63  In Burger King, a Florida franchiser brought an action 
in Florida for breach of contract and trademark infringement 
against a Michigan resident and franchisee.64  The Court held that 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Florida was proper even 
though the defendant had no physical presence in the forum.65
The Court held that personal jurisdiction existed where the
defendant “deliberately reached out beyond Michigan and
negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-
term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from 
affiliation with a nationwide organization.”66  The Court
emphasized that the defendant entered into a highly structured, 
twenty-year relationship that “envisioned continuing and wide-
reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida.”67  The Court stated 
that the “purposeful availment requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral 
activity of another party or a third person.”68  The Court stated that 
“[j]urisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately 
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial 
connection with the forum State.”69  The Court explained as 
follows:
[W]here the defendant deliberately has engaged in
62. Id. at 295.
63. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)).
64. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463 (1985).
65. Id. at 476 (stating that “so long as a commercial actor’s efforts are 
purposefully directed toward residents of another State, we have consistently 
rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal 
jurisdiction there”) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 479-80 (internal quotation omitted).
67. Id. at 480 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
68. Id. at 475 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
69. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
11
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significant activities within a State, or has created
continuing obligations between himself and the residents 
of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the 
privilege of conducting business there, and because his 
activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of 
the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to 
require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that 
forum . . . .70
Although it found that the Michigan defendant was subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Florida courts, the Court in Burger King made 
clear that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty 
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum 
with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or 
relations.”71  Where such a connection is absent, the defendant has 
“no clear notice that it is subject to suit in the forum and thus no 
opportunity to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation there.”72
The Court went on to state that “even a single act can support 
jurisdiction” where a “substantial connection” with the forum is 
created thereby.73  However, on this point, the Court was quick to 
explain:
The Court has noted, however, that some single or
occasional acts related to the forum may not be sufficient
to establish jurisdiction if their nature and quality and the 
circumstances of their commission create only an
attenuated affiliation with the forum.  This distinction 
derives from the belief that, with respect to this category 
of isolated acts, the reasonable foreseeability of litigation 
in the forum is substantially diminished.74
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions summarized 
above reflect flexibility in applying traditional personal jurisdiction 
concepts to a variety of circumstances.  The Court’s decision in 
Burger King is especially significant because it was decided after 
Calder v. Jones, the case responsible for the two completely different
results reached by the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the Griffis case.75  The Court’s
70. Id. at 475-76 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
71. Id. at 471-72 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
72. Id. at 476 n.17 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
73. Id. at 476 n.18 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
74. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
75. See Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534-35 (Minn. 2002) (recognizing 
the significance that Burger King was decided after Calder but adopting the three-
part IMO Industries test in any event).
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/15
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC 10/28/2002 10:47 PM
2002] GRIFFIS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 355
decision in Burger King contains an amalgam of personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence and articulates the fluid concepts in an 
extremely useful manner.  Thus, as will be explained in Part IV A, 
Burger King  provided a much better framework for analyzing and 
deciding Griffis than did the cases of Calder and IMO Industries.76
B. The Quagmire of Calder and IMO Industries
1. The Facts of Calder
In Calder, California resident and entertainer Shirley Jones 
sued Florida residents in California over an allegedly libelous
National Enquirer article, written and edited by two of the
defendants, concerning her California activities.77  Although the 
National Enquirer was distributed nationally, it had its largest 
circulation in California.78  Plaintiff’s profession as an entertainer 
was centered in California.79  The reporter and the editor, the 
individual defendants, moved to quash service of process for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.80  Although one defendant’s contacts with 
California, which included a visit and several phone calls, were 
alleged as a basis for jurisdiction, the Court found it unnecessary to 
consider those direct contacts with the forum.81  Instead, the Court 
held that California had personal jurisdiction over the reporter and 
editor because their Florida-based conduct was “expressly aimed” at 
California, knowing that the “brunt” of the harmful “effects” would 
be felt primarily there.82  This reasoning has become known by 
courts as the “effects test.”83  The Court emphasized that the alleged 
tort was not “mere untargeted negligence.”84  Under these
circumstances, the defendants “must ‘reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court’” in California for their out-of-state actions.85
It is important to recognize that Calder is somewhat of an 
anomaly in Supreme Court personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, as 
76. See infra Part IV.A.
77. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1984).
78. Id. at 785.
79. Id. at 788.
80. Id. at 784-85.
81. Id. at 787 n.6.
82. Id. at 789-90.
83. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998).
84. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
85. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980)).
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that decision has resulted in a myriad of different interpretations 
and applications in state and federal courts across the country.86  By 
approving the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual 
defendants based on the “effects” of their intentionally tortious 
conduct in the forum state, Calder has such potentially broad 
application that it could render any jurisdictional boundaries non-
existent and effectively nullify a long line of precedent establishing 
the limits of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.87
The results in Calder were properly mitigated by the
subsequent decision of Burger King, which, as the Griffis court 
noted, makes clear “that the foreseeability of effects in the forum is 
not itself enough to justify long-arm jurisdiction.”88  On this point, 
the Griffis court quoted Burger King as follows:
[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the 
defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in 
the forum State.  Although it has been argued that
foreseeability of causing [injury] in another State should 
be sufficient to establish such contacts there when policy
considerations so require, the Court has consistently held 
that this kind of foreseeability is not a sufficient
benchmark for exercising personal jurisdiction.  Instead, 
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is 
that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the 
forum State such are that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.89
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s explicit recognition of this aspect 
of Burger King makes its decision to import the Calder concepts even 
more baffling.  Perhaps, as the Burger King decision suggests, public 
policy considerations were at play in Calder where the courts were 
86. See, e.g., Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 533 (discussing several cases and stating 
that courts “have come to varying conclusions about how broadly the ‘effects test’ 
approved in Calder can be applied to find jurisdiction”).  See also, e.g., Donald I. 
Baker et al., Defendants Motion to Dismiss Memorandum of Points and Authorities In 
Support Thereof, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1079-80 (2000); Christine G. Heslinga, 
The Founders Go On-Line: An Original Intent Solution to a Jurisdictional Dilemma, 9 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 247, 261-62 (2000); Shelby R. Quast, International Legal 
Developments in Law Review 1998, 33 INT’L LAW 429, 431-32 (1999).
87. See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New 
Tricks: The First Amendment in an On-Line World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1167 (1996) 
(discussing the potential breadth of Calder and Keeton in establishing jurisdiction
over users and operators of Internet bulletin board systems).
88. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534.
89. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/15
FINAL FERSTER GRIFFIS.DOC 10/28/2002 10:47 PM
2002] GRIFFIS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 357
coping with the tabloid press, which possibly reflected a public 
disdain for such press at that time.  In any event, despite its obvious 
recognition that it was not necessary to incorporate the Calder
principles into its personal jurisdiction analysis,90 the Griffis decision 
has adopted a test that is entirely premised on Calder’s effects test.91
It is not clear why the Minnesota courts chose Griffis, an anomalous 
case itself, to adopt such reasoning.
2. IMO Industries—The Third Circuit’s Approach to Calder
In its decision in Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted 
that Calder has produced a variety of reactions from a multitude of 
jurisdictions.92  The Griffis court identified the Third Circuit’s
approach to Calder in IMO Industries as “the most cogent analysis of 
the Calder effects test.”93  In IMO Industries, a New Jersey
multinational corporation sued a German corporation in a New 
Jersey court for the intentional tort of interfering with the
plaintiff’s attempt to sell its wholly-owned Italian subsidiary to a 
French corporation that was one of the defendant’s competitors.94
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.95
In deciding that New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, the Third Circuit expressly stated that because the 
issue involved an intentional tort, it was required to consider Calder
in making its decision.96  The court expressed concern, however, 
90. See, e.g., M.G. Incentives, Inc. v. J.J. Marchand, 2001 WL 96223 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction existed over defendant for claims
including breach of contract, conversion, and fraud); Humphrey v. Granite Gate 
Resorts, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d without comment by 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (finding personal jurisdiction existed over defendant 
for claims of deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud);
Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident father existed for purposes of order for 
protection due to child’s suffering effects of abuse in Minnesota); Olson v.
Magnuson, 457 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (using a five-factor test for 
determining whether adequate minimum contacts exist to exercise personal
jurisdiction to conclude that the court has jurisdiction over evangelical churches 
in action alleging sexual abuse of children).
91. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 532-37.
92. Id. at 533.
93. Id. at 534.
94. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1998).
95. Id. at 268.
96. Id. at 259-60.
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over the possible breadth of the Calder decision.97  The Third 
Circuit took issue with the inference drawn from Calder that an out-
of-state defendant can anticipate being haled into the forum
because the defendant knew that the plaintiff resided in the 
forum.98 The Third Circuit concluded that the Calder effects test is 
not satisfied by the “mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the 
effect of the defendant’s tortious conduct in the forum [simply] 
because the plaintiff is located there.”99  Significantly, the Third
Circuit stated that in Calder, the Supreme Court did not “carve out 
a special intentional torts exception to the traditional specific 
jurisdiction analysis so that a plaintiff could always sue in his or her 
home state,”100 and that “Calder’s holding cannot be severed from its 
facts.”101
Notwithstanding its own recognition that Calder did not
establish a separate and distinct personal jurisdiction analysis for 
claims of intentional torts and that Calder was severely limited to its 
facts, the Third Circuit nonetheless fashioned the following three-
part test for personal jurisdiction based on Calder for use in cases 
involving intentional torts:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such 
that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that tort; and
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the 
forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal 
point of the activity.102
Even though the court in IMO Industries proclaimed that its three-
part test mitigated the overly broad potential of the Calder effects 
test, in actuality, the elements of the test appear to simply interpret 
the holding of Calder.103  Thus, the Griffis court’s decision to adopt 
97. Id. at 262-63.
98. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 534 (paraphrasing the Third Circuit’s concern 
about the breadth of the Calder test).
99. IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 263.
100. Id. at 265.
101. Id. at 261.
102. Id. at 265.
103. See Christopher Allen Kroblin, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach for 
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the IMO Industries test will do little to protect litigants from the 
overbroad concepts of personal jurisdiction articulated in Calder.
The focus of the IMO Industries test is the third-prong—the
“expressly aimed” portion of the test.104  If it is found that the 
defendant “expressly aimed” its tortious conduct at the forum, then 
the need to consider whether the brunt of the harm was actually 
suffered by the plaintiff in the forum arises.105  In order for a court 
to make the “expressly aimed” determination, the plaintiff “must 
show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the 
brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum, 
and point to specific activity indicating that the defendant expressly
aimed its tortious conduct at the forum.”106  The resulting analysis 
required by this prong of the test would arguably involve extensive 
fact finding regarding intricate details of the case, including
causation, the subjective knowledge of a defendant, and the
potential need to determine the intent of the defendant when it 
“aimed” a tortious act at the forum.  Indeed, the first part of the 
test—whether the defendant committed an intentional tort—
appears to require that a fact determination be made by the court 
at the threshold juncture of jurisdictional disputes.  Applying this 
three-prong test, the court concluded that the plaintiff was unable 
to demonstrate the requisite conduct indicating that the defendant
“expressly aimed” its tortious conduct at New Jersey.107
3. The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts the IMO Industries
Three-Part Personal Jurisdiction Test
The Griffis court, in adopting the Third Circuit’s three-part
test, expressly shared the Third Circuit’s concern over the breadth 
of the potential application of Calder.108  Similarly, the Griffis court 
Intentional Torts: Implications for Cyber Contacts, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 81-82
(2001) (recognizing that three elements must be met for the Calder effects test to 
be satisfied: (1) an intentional act; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) 
causing harm that the defendant knows the brunt of which will be felt in the 
forum state); Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and 
Substantial Justice Lost in Cyber-Space: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory 
Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2001) (listing similar three-part Calder
test).
104. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 266 (3d Cir. 1998).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 268.
108. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 2002). See also supra notes
90-94 and accompanying text.
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agreed with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the Supreme Court 
did not create an exception to the personal jurisdiction analysis for 
intentional torts.109  Still, the Griffis decision adopted the Third 
Circuit’s test along with its inconsistent reasoning, thus
perpetuating the notion that Calder must be applied under
circumstances involving intentional torts.110
In Griffis, the court applied the Third Circuit’s three-part test 
and analyzed the facts giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim of personal 
jurisdiction.111  Like the IMO Industries court, the court in Griffis
focused on whether the defendant “expressly aimed the allegedly
tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum was the focal 
point of the tortious activity.”112  In determining whether the 
defendant “knew that the plaintiff would suffer the brunt of the 
harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum,” the court 
reviewed the record for any indication that Luban “expressly aimed 
[her] tortious conduct at the forum.”113  The plaintiff had argued
that the following facts provided a basis for jurisdiction: (1) Luban 
directed her defamatory statements at the Alabama forum because 
she targeted her messages at the plaintiff, whom Luban knew to be 
an Alabama resident; (2) Luban knew that the messages posted to 
the archeology newsgroup could be read anywhere in the world 
and that, in fact, they were read by the plaintiff in Alabama; and (3) 
that Luban’s statements had “deleterious effects” on plaintiff’s 
business and reputation.114
Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the Griffis court found that 
Luban did not expressly aim the statements at Alabama.115  Instead,
the court found that Luban “intentionally directed [her
statements] at Griffis, whom she knew to be an Alabama
resident . . . .”116  In so finding, the court noted that the statements 
were not “targeted at the state of Alabama or at an Alabama 
audience beyond Griffis herself.”117  Interestingly, it is difficult to 
understand how this aspect of the test is much different from 




113. Id. at 535-36.
114. Id. at 535.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (stating that the other two prongs of the effects test need not be 
addressed because all three prongs must be satisfied for jurisdiction to attach).
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purposeful availment concepts discussed earlier in connection with 
existing personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  Although Griffis 
argued that the newsgroup to which Luban posted her messages 
was “widely read by her colleagues,”118 the court found that the 
record contained no evidence that “any other person in Alabama 
read the statements.”119
Ironically, the court also noted that Griffis had not asserted 
that “Alabama has a unique relationship with the field of
Egyptology, like the close relationship between the plaintiff’s
profession and the forum state that the Supreme Court found 
relevant in Calder.”120  The court’s acknowledgment of this unique 
aspect of Calder serves to highlight its incongruous decision to 
incorporate Calder into Minnesota personal jurisdiction law,
particularly under the anomalous facts of this case.  The court went 
on to conclude that “the fact that messages posted to the
newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have 
been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice to establish
Alabama as the focal point of the defendant’s conduct.”121
The Griffis court’s findings are consistent with long-standing
principles of minimum contacts and purposeful availment, as 
discussed in Part IV A, making the adoption of the Third Circuit’s 
three-part test wholly unnecessary.  In addition, the Griffis court
engaged in evaluating whether the allegedly defamatory statements 
harmed Griffis.  The court found no support in the record for the 
assertion that “Luban’s messages were read by any other person in 
Alabama, or by anyone in the academic community at the
University of Alabama” and concluded that Griffis had not been 
harmed.122  In so concluding, the court effectively decided that an 
essential element of defamation was lacking—that of publication.123
As a result, the three-part test adopted by the Griffis court has the 
potential to encourage future courts to make personal jurisdiction
decisions by deciding underlying substantive claims, a posture that 
has heretofore been wholly unnecessary in personal jurisdiction





123. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d, 590, 594 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2000) (“For a statement to meet the legal standards for defamation, ‘it must 
be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff.’”) (quoting Stuempges v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980)).
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analyses.
Given that the Griffis court had ample personal jurisdiction 
authority at its disposal, the court should not have adopted IMO
Industries’ questionable three-part test.  It is unclear whether the 
supreme court intends this test to displace existing Minnesota 
personal jurisdiction authority in all cases, in cases involving
intentional torts, or only in cases involving enforcement of foreign 
judgments.  As a consequence, the Griffis decision is at odds with 
the primary purposes of the Due Process Clause: notice and 
predictability of the legal system, which allows potential defendants 
to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance 
as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to 
suit.124  As discussed next, the Calder/IMO Industries debacle
apparent in Griffis could have been avoided by applying existing, 
long-standing judicial authority to determine that the Alabama 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over Luban.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND 
PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS OF GRIFFIS
This section illustrates of the following concepts: (A) Griffis
could have been decided using existing principles of personal 
jurisdiction, obviating any need to resort to the adoption of the 
IMO Industries test; (B) persuasive authority from federal circuit 
courts provide a more useful and reasonable framework for
analyzing Calder and IMO Industries; (C) in light of Minnesota 
statutes and case law, the application of Griffis to cases arising 
under Minnesota law should be strictly limited to its facts; and (D) 
existing Minnesota authority may be relied on in cases involving 
issues of personal jurisdiction, intentional torts, and Internet
contacts, further demonstrating the limited practical applicability 
of Griffis to cases arising under substantive Minnesota law.
A. Deciding Griffis Using Existing Personal Jurisdiction Principles
In finding that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant, the Griffis court found that (1) the defendant 
did not expressly aim the statements in question at Alabama; (2) 
the target and only recipient of the statements was the plaintiff 
herself, not the state of Alabama or a larger Alabama audience; and 
124. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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(3) the defendant posted messages to an Internet newsgroup that 
could have been read in Alabama or anywhere else in the world.125
In evaluating the quality and nature of Luban’s activities, Griffis’ 
claims do not articulate any connection between Luban and
Alabama in which Luban purposefully availed herself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the jurisdiction.126  Luban’s 
activities occurred within the context of an Internet newsgroup to 
which members from all over the globe had access.127  The purpose 
of the newsgroup is to share ideas about a particular subject—
Egyptology—which does not implicate Luban in taking advantage 
of any of the laws or protections of Alabama.  Luban similarly did 
not direct her activities toward the state of Alabama.128  Rather, her 
activities were directed toward the newsgroup—an amorphous 
location—and at Griffis herself.  Like the plaintiffs in World Wide 
Volkswagen, the chance “meeting” of Luban and Griffis via the 
newsgroup and the subsequent disagreement that occurred in the 
context of postings to the newsgroup website did not make it 
foreseeable that injury to Griffis would occur in Alabama.  Indeed, 
any conduct and connection between Luban and Alabama was 
patently absent in this case.  Such connection is critical to the due 
process analysis. Such an attenuated, chance, and isolated
connection does not provide a basis to conclude that Luban was on 
notice that she may be sued in Alabama.129  This lack of notice 
prevented Luban from structuring her conduct to avoid suit in 
Alabama.  Given this lack of purposeful activity directed at the 
forum, Luban could not reasonably have anticipated being haled 
into court there.130
In addition, the fact that Luban directed her activities at a 
resident of the forum does not, in and of itself, give rise to personal 
jurisdiction in this case.131  As the Court in Burger King stated, in 
order for a non-resident to be liable in the forum state for injuries 
that were proximately caused by the defendant’s activity, the
defendant must have “engaged in significant activities within a state 
125. Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535-36 (Minn. 2002).
126. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
127. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 530.
128. Id. at 535.
129. Id. at 536-37.
130. Id.
131. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (stating that 
the defendant must also have fair warning that an activity will subject them to 
foreign jurisdiction).
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or [have] created continuing obligations between himself and the 
residents of the forum.”132  Here, Luban’s activities—statements
made in the context of the newsgroup website—do not create 
substantial connections with Alabama or continuing obligations 
between herself and Griffis.  Unlike the defendant in Burger King,
Luban neither reached out to Griffis for any specific reason related 
to her residence in Alabama; nor cultivated a relationship with 
Griffis that necessitated continuing contact with either Griffis or 
Alabama.  Luban’s activity involved communications with Griffis
and other users of the newsgroup, which pertained to a topic of 
study and conversation.133  Within that context, differences of 
opinion apparently occurred.  Subsequent statements made by 
Luban grew out of these differences of opinion.  The knowledge of 
the fact that the postings could have been received in Alabama, or 
anywhere else in the world for that matter, lacks the type of 
foreseeability sufficient to put the defendant on notice of being 
haled into court in the forum.134
Further, while in some circumstances “even a single act can 
support jurisdiction,” Luban’s conduct did not create the requisite 
substantial connection with Alabama.135  Any connection or
affiliation with Alabama arising from Luban’s conduct was
“attenuated” at best.136  Consequently, the foreseeability of litigation 
in Alabama based on the isolated nature of Luban’s actions was 
substantially diminished.137  Thus, the Alabama court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over Luban when it rendered its default 
judgment and, therefore, the Alabama judgment should not be 
entitled to full faith and credit in Minnesota.
The above analysis is only one example of how existing
authority and concepts could have been used to reach the same 
result the Griffis court reached without the adoption of a new 
personal jurisdiction test.  There may be some benefit to an
enhanced personal jurisdiction analysis for certain types of claims 
132. Id. at 476 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
133. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 530.
134. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due 
process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.”)).
135. See id. at 476 n.18.
136. See id. at 475-76.
137. See id. (stating that an isolated act usually diminishes the reasonable 
foreseeability of litigation in the forum).
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where public policy considerations are required.  Nevertheless, 
without providing more guidance, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
should have ignored the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Calder
and decided the case on the particular facts using long-standing
personal jurisdiction authority and principles.  This is especially so 
for two reasons: (1) the claims at issue in Griffis arose in the unique 
posture of the attempted Minnesota enforcement of the default 
Alabama judgment; and (2) the same claims under Minnesota law, 
as discussed next, would have been decided in an entirely different 
manner.
B. Other Persuasive Authority Interpreting Calder
A recent case from the federal district court in Minnesota 
demonstrates that other avenues were open to the Griffis court in 
interpreting and applying Calder.  In Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning, 
LLC, the plaintiff sued a corporate defendant and an individual
defendant for copyright infringement.138  The defendants moved to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The court dismissed, 
without prejudice, claims against the individual defendant, but 
allowed the action to proceed against the corporate defendant.139
The court held that the individual defendant’s activities, which 
consisted of attending a one-day conference in Minnesota and 
giving a speech that was generally related to the topic of the 
copyright infringement allegations, did not relate to or arise from
the plaintiff’s claims.  Thus the court held, it could not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over her.140  The plaintiff had argued,
however, that the defendant’s conduct should be subjected to the 
Calder effects test because the defendants intentionally infringed on 
the copyright of a Minnesota resident.141
In determining that the Calder effects test did not apply to the 
individual defendant, the court cited a number of federal circuit 
court cases.142  First, the court prefaced its analysis by stating that 
“the mere fact that [the plaintiff] has alleged that Defendants 
committed an intentional tort against her . . . does not necessarily 
justify haling them in to a Minnesota Court.”143  It then stated that 
138. 2002 WL 31053211 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2002).
139. Id. at *5-6.
140. Id. at *4.
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id. at *4-5.
143. Id. at *4 (quoting IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 262, and citing Hicklin Eng’g 
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“[a]lthough courts ‘have struggled somewhat with Calder’s import’
it is clear that the effects test does not entirely supplant minimum 
contacts analysis.”144
In declining to apply the Calder effects test to the individual 
defendant, the court found that “[n]either the allegedly infringing 
materials in this case nor the harm from those materials is
exclusively or primarily centered in this forum.”145   Thus, it appears 
that since there were no underlying contacts between the forum 
and the individual defendant, the court refused to exercise
personal jurisdiction over her.  On the other hand, the court relied 
on the Calder effects test and the plaintiff’s allegations to bolster its 
findings that the corporate defendant had purposefully directed its 
activities at Minnesota such that personal jurisdiction over that 
defendant was proper.146
Given the plethora of existing persuasive authority
interpreting the Calder effects test in a more thorough and
reasonable manner—as demonstrated by the Mulcahy court—it is 
unclear why the Griffis court proceeded to adopt the IMO Industries
court’s three-part test, especially with no further guidance as to its 
future applicability.
C. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday: No Personal Jurisdiction in 
Minnesota over Claims of Defamation and Privacy via the Internet
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday,147 the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held that alleged defamatory contacts of a Washington 
State resident, made via e-mail to various locations in Minnesota, 
did not subject the Washington resident to personal jurisdiction in 
Inc. v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Swiss Am. 
Bank Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623 (1st Cir. 2001); Panda Bradywine Corp. v. Potomac 
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001); Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d 
1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 1985)).
144. Id. at *5 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087, and discussing 
Dakota Indus. Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946, F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th Cir. 
1991); Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 624; Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 
286-87 (5th Cir. 1997)).
145. Id. at *5.
146. Id. at *5. Cf. Raymedica, Inc. v. Vladimir Stoy, 2002 WL 31185916 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 30, 2002).  There, the court held that the effects test is an alternative 
and equal basis of jurisdiction.  Even absent a finding of minimum contacts, the 
court held that satisfaction of the effects test was enough to confer jurisdiction. Id.
at *4-5.
147. 617 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
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Minnesota.148  In that case, the plaintiff, Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
(“Northwest”), sued Washington resident Louise Friday (“Friday”) 
for defamation and business disparagement in Minnesota.  The 
defendant and her husband, Craig Friday, had previously sued 
Northwest in Washington for claims in connection with Mr.
Friday’s employment.149  Defendant Friday sent out a press release 
by e-mail from Washington that repeated many of the lawsuit’s
allegations and attached an electronic copy of the complaint.150  In 
response, Northwest sued Friday for defamation and business 
disparagement.151  Friday disputed that the Minnesota court had 
personal jurisdiction over her.152  The chief distinction between 
Friday and Griffis is that Alabama’s personal jurisdiction law differs 
significantly from Minnesota’s long-arm statute with regard to 
claims of defamation and privacy.153  It is important to understand 
this difference between the two cases because it severely limits the 
applicability of Griffis to future personal jurisdiction cases arising 
under Minnesota defamation and privacy law.
Northwest alleged in its complaint that the “press release was 
issued in Minnesota and elsewhere,” and that it was “picked up by 
newspapers that are published in the Twin Cities.”154  Friday 
admitted that the “e-mail was addressed to individuals in various 
cities throughout the country, and one or more of the addressees 
were located in Minnesota.”155  However, she also averred that she 
owned no property in Minnesota, transacted no business in
Minnesota, was not employed in Minnesota, and had only been in 
Minnesota once, to change planes, in the last few years.156  The 
district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction 
relying on Minnesota’s long-arm statute.157
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal, noting that
148. Id. at 592.
149. Id. (stating that the allegations contained in the Washington complaint 
included whistleblower retaliation, humiliation, defamation, emotional distress, 
ADA violations, harassment, and allegations that Craig Friday was fit to fly, and 
that Northwest’s actions to the contrary were taken in retaliation for his numerous 




153. See Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
154. Northwest Airlines, 617 N.W.2d at 592.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 596.
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“although both state and federal law must be satisfied, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the long-arm statute in 
such a way that ‘when analyzing most personal jurisdiction
questions, Minnesota courts may simply apply the federal case law’ 
on minimum contacts.”158  However, the Friday case involved an 
exception to that general rule “requiring [the court] to interpret a 
little-used provision in [Minnesota’s] long-arm statute.”159
Minnesota’s long-arm statute provides that Minnesota courts do not 
have jurisdiction over nonresidents when “the cause of action lies 
in defamation or privacy.”160  The Friday court stated that
“according to the plain terms of the statute, when an act is
committed outside Minnesota that causes injury inside the state, 
and the cause of action asserted is defamation or privacy, there is 
no personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.”161  Thus, 
the central issue in Friday was “whether, by sending ‘one or more’ 
allegedly defamatory e-mails to Minnesota recipients, Friday
committed an ‘act in Minnesota’ or an ‘act outside Minnesota.’”162
The Friday court rejected Northwest’s claims that the operative 
“act” for purposes of defamation occurs when the defamatory 
information is received rather than when it is made or sent.163  Such a 
construction would mean that, for purposes of the long-arm
statute, the defendant committed an “act” within the state, thus 
removing her conduct from the defamation exception of the long-
arm statute.164  In addressing this point, the Friday court stated that:
The publication of a defamatory statement . . . does
indeed require two acts: the act of the alleged defamer in 
making the statement, and the act of a third party in 
understanding it.  Given this fact, our decision in Wheeler
properly focuses on the act committed by the defendant—
making the allegedly defamatory statement—as the
operative act for purposes of determining jurisdiction 
158. Id. at 592 (citing Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408 
(Minn. 1992)).
159. Id. at 592-93 (citing MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1998)).
160. Id.; see supra note 17.
161. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000) (citing Paulucci v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1335, 1342 (D. 
Minn. 1997) (stating that a defamation “case presents one of the statute’s
anomalies, and falls outside ‘most’ of the jurisdictional questions”)).
162. Id. (comparing MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1(c), with MINN. STAT. § 
543.19, subd. 1(d)(3)).
163. Id. at 594.
164. See id.
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under the long-arm statute.165
In arguing that Minnesota had jurisdiction over Friday,
Northwest urged the court to view contacts made via the Internet 
and e-mail as qualitatively different from regular mail, telephone 
calls, and faxes.166  This assertion was intertwined with the argument 
that the operative “act” for purposes of defamation was the receipt 
of the allegedly defamatory information.167  However, the court 
declined to adopt such a position stating:
Although Northwest argues that “the phenomenon and 
power” of the Internet justifies a different result, it has 
failed to demonstrate why that should be so in this case.
This case involves “one or more” individually sent and 
received e-mails, which, as the district court cogently 
observed, are “just electronic mail.”  Northwest has
provided no reason why the fact that the letters in this 
case were sent by e-mail should cause a different result
than if they were sent by traditional mail.  The legislature 
obviously did not have the Internet in mind when it 
drafted the long-arm statute, and the legislature may well 
wish to reconsider the statute in light of “the
phenomenon and power” of the Internet.  Such
considerations, however, are not relevant in this case, and 
our decision is the result of a straightforward application 
of the long-arm statute and relevant caselaw.168
As of October, 2002, Minnesota’s long-arm statute remains
unchanged from when the court decided Friday in 2000.169
In its brief to the appeals court, Northwest also argued for the 
application of the Calder effects test.170  The Friday court
disregarded Calder entirely in making its decision, instead focusing 
on “a straightforward application of the [Minnesota] long-arm
statute and relevant caselaw.”171  Thus, the unique procedural 
posture of Griffis cannot be disregarded when evaluating its
reasoning because, in Minnesota, claims of defamation and privacy 
are subject to dismissal under the Minnesota long-arm statute.  As 
165. See id. (internal quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 594-95.
167. See Brief of Appellant, at 11-12, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 
N.W.2d 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (No. C1-00-528).
168. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday, 617 N.W.2d 590, 594-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000).
169. See MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1 (2002).
170. See supra note 167, at 1, 16-17.
171. Northwest Airlines, 617 N.W.2d at 595.
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such, Griffis is limited to its specific facts and its unique procedural 
posture.
D. Minnesota Cases Involving Issues of Personal Jurisdiction, 
Intentional Torts, and Internet Contacts
At least two cases have been decided in Minnesota that did not 
involve defamation and privacy claims in which Internet contacts
were argued to have created the requisite sufficient minimum 
contacts.  In Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts,172 the court of appeals
considered the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction over an 
Internet advertiser engaged in soliciting business for an on-line
gambling enterprise.173  The Internet advertiser provided a Nevada
telephone number for interested consumers to call.174  The
Minnesota Attorney General sued the defendant advertiser for 
deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud on 
the Internet.175  In affirming the district court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the court of appeals focused on the 
commercial nature of the contacts made by the advertiser (which 
included a finding that Minnesota Internet users had accessed the 
advertiser’s website over 248 times in a two-week period) and 
concluded that, for purposes of due process, the advertiser had 
purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in 
Minnesota.176  In so holding, the court stated that “[a]dvertising in 
the forum state, or establishing channels for providing regular 
advice to customers in the forum state indicates a defendant’s 
intent to serve the market in that state.”177  The court wisely 
cautioned, however, that it will “take some time to determine the 
precise balance between the rights of those who use the Internet to 
disseminate information and the powers of the jurisdictions in 
which receiving computers are located to regulate for the general 
welfare.”178  The court applied established legal principles of
personal jurisdiction and limited its task to deciding the dispute 
based on the particular facts of the case before it.
172. 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d without comment by 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
173. See id. at 718.
174. Id. at 717.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 718-19.
177. Id. at 719.
178. Id. at 718.
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More recently, in the unpublished decision of M.G. Incentives,
Inc. v. Marchand,179 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
whose contacts with the plaintiff included e-mail.180  In that case, a 
Minnesota business incentives company sued a non-resident
company alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, conversion, and 
fraud in connection with the sale of marketing tools.181  In
exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant, however, the 
court specifically rejected the argument that the defendant’s e-mail
contacts alone established personal jurisdiction.182  In so concluding,
the court stated as follows:
[I]s it not a nonresident’s contacts with the forum state,
and not with the forum state’s residents, that determines
whether minimal contacts exist?  An email message is 
directed to a specific person, or rather to a specific email 
address, and that address is independent of the intended 
recipient’s geographical location.  Email stands virtually 
alone in communications traffic, unfettered by any
specific geographical site.  People often review their email 
from locations other than where they principally conduct 
business.  To conclude that email contacts alone might 
establish personal jurisdiction would potentially subject
the sender to jurisdiction in any state in which the
recipient reviews a message.  We leave it to the supreme 
court to determine whether email correspondence alone 
may establish personal jurisdiction.183
The court went on to apply existing Minnesota authority and 
principles of personal jurisdiction in evaluating the defendant’s 
non-email contacts with the plaintiff.184  In finding the defendant’s 
contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the court focused on 
the selling behavior of the defendant, which included faxes, phone 
calls, mailings, and an in-person visit to the plaintiff.185
The contacts at issue in Griffis can be likened to the e-mail
contacts discussed, and rejected, in M.G. Incentives.  Internet
postings, like e-mail, may be directed at a particular individual 
179. 2001 WL 96223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
180. M.G. Incentives, 2001 WL 96223, at *4.
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id. at *3.
183. Id.
184. See id. at *2-*3.
185. Id. at *4.
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independent of an intended target or a recipient’s geographical 
location.  Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Griffis
recognized this very concept in concluding that Luban’s postings to 
the newsgroup could not provide the basis of jurisdiction.186  Like e-
mail, Internet postings are not restricted by specific geographical 
sites.  Like e-mail, postings to an Internet newsgroup may be 
reviewed from locations other than where the senders or recipients 
of the postings conduct business or reside.  Similarly, jurisdiction 
based on postings made to an Internet newsgroup could potentially 
subject the sender to jurisdiction in any state in which the recipient 
reviews the message.  Given the existence of Minnesota authority 
addressing relevant issues of personal jurisdiction and Internet 
contacts, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adoption of the Third 
Circuit’s three-part test for intentional torts was unwarranted. 
V. CONCLUSION
With its decision in Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
appears to have adopted a new test for personal jurisdiction
involving claims of intentional torts that would potentially displace 
existing Minnesota authority.  This new test is embodied in a case 
that had nothing to do with underlying substantive Minnesota law.
Rather, the fundamental question in Griffis involved the
enforcement of a foreign court judgment applying Alabama law in 
a Minnesota court.  It is important to note that had the claims in 
Griffis arisen under Minnesota law, Northwest Airlines v. Friday would 
have been applied.  Given its peculiar posture, Griffis provided an 
unlikely vehicle for such a fundamental change in Minnesota’s 
personal jurisdiction law.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
Third Circuit’s test is in inherent conflict with its recognition—and
the Third Circuit’s recognition—that no special category of
personal jurisdiction analysis exists for intentional torts.  This
internal inconsistency in the reasoning of Griffis produces a
practical problem for future litigants in that it fails to express 
whether the new test actually displaces existing Minnesota personal 
jurisdiction law and if so, under what conditions.  Finally, when 
considered carefully, the test adopted by Griffis, which focuses on 
whether the defendant “expressly aimed the allegedly tortious 
conduct at the forum such that the forum was the focal point of the 
186. Griffis v. Luban,  646 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn. 2002).
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tortious activity,” does not appear to differ greatly from the
“purposeful availment” criteria of long-standing personal
jurisdiction law.187  While such a focus may comprise an enhanced 
criteria, a truly separate and distinct category of analysis seems to 
be lacking, further exposing the flaws inherent in the Third 
Circuit’s reasoning, as well as the Griffis court’s subsequent
adoption of the same.188
Although the Third Circuit and the Griffis courts proclaimed 
that the IMO Industries test controls the potential for the overly 
broad application of Calder, their decisions have added a host of 
complicated factors to an already imprecise process.  Far from 
expressing coherent views regarding Internet contacts and personal 
jurisdiction, the confusion surrounding the test adopted by the 
Griffis court will likely spawn years of litigation and require further 
clarification, definition, and guidance regarding the proper
application of the test.  As such, the Griffis decision evinces an 
unnecessary muddying of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction waters.
187. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 2002 WL 31053211 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 
2002), at *5 (citing United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st 
Cir. 2001)).
188. Id. (relying on Calder to bolster its exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
the corporate defendant).
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